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¶1 The following are notable intellectual property decisions for patent and trademark 
in 2010 in the United States.  Notable copyright and trade secret cases will be examined 
in a subsequent article.  Viewed across doctrinal lines, some interesting threads emerge 
involving the scope of protection, the amount of secondary liability, and ownership of the 
intellectual property rights. 
¶2 The scope of protection was at issue in both areas.  Bilski v. Kappos marked a shift 
from using technical tests for patent subject matter to relying on the basic exclusions 
against patents on laws of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas.1  Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO called into question the many thousands of issued 
patents on human genes.2  In trademark, the issue of which uses may be potentially 
infringing remains unsettled. 
¶3 The issue of secondary liability remains widely litigated, as rights holders seek both 
deep pocket defendants and a means to cut off individual infringers.  The courts applied 
slightly different standards as to the state of mind required for secondary liability.  eBay 
was not liable for sales of counterfeit trademarked goods, unless it had knowledge of  
particular infringing listings.3  But in patent (in a case involving importation of goods), 
deliberate indifference to the risk of patent infringement was held sufficient by the 
Federal Circuit—a ruling that the Supreme Court has taken on review.4 
¶4 Many of the cases involved disputes between hiring and hired parties over the 
ownership of intellectual property rights.  The Supreme Court took a case on whether 
professors or universities may assign rights to federally funded inventions.5 
¶5 A number of cases concerned the relationship between intangible rights and 
physical works.  Pequignot v. Solo Cup addressed the extent of liability for inaccurately 
marking a product as patented.6  Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. analyzed 
how an applicant must show possession of an invention in order to be entitled to a 
patent.7  Intervet v. Merial Ltd. analyzed whether the scope of a biotech patent is limited 
to a sample that the inventor submitted to show possession of the invention.8  Au-
 
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law.  This listing and analysis are decidedly 
subjective, and all the usual disclaimers apply.  Comments welcome: smcjohn@suffolk.edu. 
1 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
2 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
3 Tiffany v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
4 SEB (T-Fal) v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 178 L. Ed. 2d 
286 (2010). 
5 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems Inc., 583 F.3d 
832 (Fed. Cir, 2009), cert. granted, 178 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2010). 
6 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
7 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
8 617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America decided whether the owner of genuine 
Volkswagen badges could affix them to other cars sold.9  Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. 
Franek held that the shape of a round beach towel could not be protected as a 
trademark.10  
I. PATENT  
1. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2010) 
¶6 The Supreme Court, for the first time in decades, addressed the boundaries of 
patentable subject matter.  The specific question was whether a general process for using 
commodity exchange transactions to hedge risks fell within patentable subject matter.  
The more general question was, what standard governs the patentability of processes.  
Bilski rejected a rigid test formulated by the Federal Circuit, under which a process was 
only patentable if it was tied to a particular machine or transformed an article.11  That 
test, if narrowly applied, could have barred many patents on business methods, software, 
and biotech processes (such as diagnostic methods).  Bilski rejected the machine-or-
transformation test, along with earlier tests that courts have formulated, such as the State 
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. useful-concrete-tangible 
test,12 the rule against patenting “mental steps,”13 or the applied-algorithm test.14  Bilski 
did not, however, formulate a new test for patentable subject matter; rather it left in place 
the long-standing rule that bars patents for laws of nature, physical phenomena, or 
abstract ideas. 
¶7 Bilski also specifically declined to adopt a categorical exclusion for patents on 
business methods.  Had Bilski held that business methods were not patentable, that would 
have required courts to define just what a “business method” is—something neither 
courts nor commentators have achieved, despite much discussion of whether business 
methods should be patentable.15 
¶8 After Bilski, patent law takes an approach similar to copyright law, with respect to 
subject matter.  Ideas are not copyrightable.  That deceptively simple rule really states a 
broad policy, which cases have applied differently in different areas, ranging from 
literature to computer software.  Copyright has managed to adapt to several generations 
of new technology by holding that ideas are not copyrightable, but the expression of an 
idea is.  Bilski indicates a similar approach in patent law.  Bilski would seem to move 
away from attempt to define patent subject matter with various technical tests.  Bilski 
instead leaves a broad rule against patents that claim laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
 
9 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010). 
10 615 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2010). 
11 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
12 See 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (1998). 
13 See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding pure mental process not 
patentable). 
14 See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (formulating test known as the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test used primarily in software).  For Professor Dratler’s thorough critique of the tests, see 
generally 1 JAY DRATLER, JR. AND STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL 
CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 2.03 (1991 & Supp. 2004–2010). 
15 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One 
Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 766–68 (2006). 
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or abstract ideas, but leaving open patent protection on applications of laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, or abstract ideas.  
2. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U. S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)  
¶9 Molecular Pathology reopens the question of the patentability of genes.  As noted 
in Bilski, courts have long denied patent protection for natural phenomena.  That would 
seem to bar patents on genes that exist in nature.  But the Federal Circuit has repeatedly 
upheld the validity of gene patents.16  The USPTO has issued many thousands of patents 
on genes, on the theory that by isolating the gene, the inventor has identified something 
that is different from the gene as it exists in nature.  
¶10 Molecular Pathology, however, rejected this reasoning, holding that isolated DNA 
is not “markedly different” from the gene, encoded in DNA as it appears in nature.  The 
court invalidated patents held by Myriad Genetics on two genes related to breast and 
ovarian cancer, along with Myriad’s patents on methods to detect cancer by analyzing 
and comparing a person’s DNA.  Molecular Pathology presents a conflict between two 
deep policies: the policy of providing an incentive for socially valuable innovations (such 
as discovering genes linked to disease) and the policies of leaving nature phenomena 
open to scientific research and preventing ownership of natural phenomena—especially 
acute where the ownership is of human genes.  In that vein, Molecular Pathology 
presents a difficult distinction between discovering natural phenomena and inventions 
that apply that knowledge.  
¶11 The appeal is pending before the Federal Circuit.  The importance of the case may 
be difficult to assess.  Patents on single genes may be less important that had been 
believed only a few years ago.  Even though the human genome has been sequenced, few 
diseases or conditions have been linked to single genes.  Rather, many genes are usually 
involved, which may diminish the importance of any single gene patent.17 
3. Bid for Position, LLC v. AOL, LLC, 601 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
¶12 As Bilski shows, one hazard of patents (especially software and business method 
patents), is that they may be too abstract, giving patents on idea as opposed to an 
application of an idea.  A similar problem is that even where an application is claimed, 
the abstract words to claim processes may be hard to interpret and could be read more 
broadly than the actual invention.18  Bid for Position illustrates that much may turn on 
interpretation of particular patent claims.  The court held that Google’s AdWords system 
 
16 See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  Notably, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly 
upheld gene patents in cases like Deuel without directly addressing the threshold issue of subject matter.  
17 See Katherine Harmon, Genome Sequencing for the Rest of Us, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, June 28, 2010 
(“[o]ther diseases, such as Alzheimer’s, have no uniform genetic signature—or clear way of avoiding 
them—leaving many to wonder about the science and utility behind the results many genome scans 
offer.”). 
18 See generally, JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 199, 256 (2008) (discussing hazards of “abstract patent claims” 
in software and business method patents, which may “cover unknown territory, claiming technologies that 
are unknown at the time the patent is filed and that might change over time, especially in the fast-moving 
fields of technology”). 
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did not infringe patent claims on a method for continuous online auctioning of “priority 
position” for advertisers.  Read broadly, the claim could have given patent protection 
over online auctions of advertising.  The court construed it to apply only to auctions 
similar to those described in the written description portion of the patent application.  
Bilski addressed a momentous question—what is the extent of patentable subject matter.  
But in practical terms, cases like Bid for Position may play a more important role.  Few 
patents fall at the borders of patentable subject matter—but because every patent claim is 
unique, interpretation of claims plays the workhorse role in determining what is actually 
patented.19 
4. In re ‘318 Patent Infringement Litigation (Janssen Pharmaceutica v. Teva), 583 F.3d 
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
¶13 The utility requirement is another front on the battle against patenting ideas.  Bilski 
dealt with the issue of a broad patent claim on an abstract idea.  The utility requirement—
the requirement that the applicant show the invention has a specific, existing 
usefulness—prevents ideas from being patented before application to an invention.  
Janssen Pharmaceutica shows that the utility requirement still has bite, especially in the 
area of pharmaceuticals.  The court held invalid a patent on a method of treatment (by 
administering a drug) for Alzheimer’s disease.  The patent failed to meet the utility 
requirement because, at the time of filing the patent application, the applicant did not 
show efficacy of the drug, through either neither in vitro test results nor animal test 
results.  The court also rejected the argument that utility could be shown by “analytic 
reasoning.” 
¶14 Janssen could be coupled with ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals LLC.20  In 
Alza Corp., the court invalidated a broad patent claim on a method for using a drug to 
treat attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder.  The patent application did not meet the 
enablement requirement, which requires the applicant to disclose how to make and use 
the full scope of the claimed invention.21  The application did not properly disclose the 
method of ascertaining dosage in the manner necessary to support the broad claim.  In 
short, the enablement requirement guards against parties claiming more broadly than the 
invention they have disclosed.  It likewise guards against patenting ideas, because it 
requires a broad claim to be supported by description of how to fully make and use the 
invention.  
¶15 Janssen and ALZA, taken together, show what may really be at stake in cases like 
Bilski and Molecular Pathology.  If genes are patentable, such patents must still meet the 
utility and enablement requirements.  Thousands of patents on isolated genes exist, but 
some applicants may not have shown a specific practical utility at the time of the 
application.  If they did, the claims would still be limited to the scope of the useful 
invention disclosed.  On the other hand, if patent claims on isolated genes are held 
invalid, the patentees in many cases will have other claims to fall back on.  Useful 
 
19 Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010), addressed the relationship between 
disclosure of the invention and the interpretation of biotech claims.  The court held that the claims to a 
porcine circovirus should not be limited to the specific type of virus deposited as a sample.  Id. at 1287. 
20 ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
21 Id. 
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inventions based on those genes would still be patentable.  So, in many cases, the 
controversies about the scope of patent subject matter do not determine the scope of what 
specific inventions may be patented. 
5. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
¶16 Princo is an important case with respect to the ability a patent holder has to impose 
restrictions on its licensing practices that may impact competition.  Antitrust law provides 
remedies where a patent holder misuses market power or attempts to monopolize a 
market in prohibited ways.  But most patents do not provide monopoly power, rather at 
best give exclusive rights to one product or service that competes against others.  A long-
standing issue has been, when does anti-competitive behavior become patent misuse?  In 
Princo, the en banc Federal Circuit made it difficult to show patent misuse.  The court 
held misuse inapplicable to a patent pool license program for an industry standard for 
compact disk technology.  In general terms, the court held that when a patentee offers to 
license a patent, the patentee does not misuse that patent by inducing a third party not to 
license its separate, competitive technology.  Princo gives latitude to patent holders to 
leverage their exclusive rights into other markets—somewhat in tension with the first sale 
cases discussed below. 
6. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
¶17 Solo Cup greatly reduced the potential liability for false patent marking.  Sellers 
like to include patent numbers on products and packaging.  “U.S. Patent Number 
4,404,078” on the package of, say, a shoe horn, may suggest to potential buyers that it is 
a true invention.  An inventor is entitled to patent any new and nonobvious invention.  It 
need not be superior to existing products, particularly effective, or even safe.  But the 
patent marking on a package nevertheless may suggest to consumer that the item is better 
than competing products and somehow sanctioned by the U.S. government.  It also 
discourages competitors from copying the product.  Manufacturers, however, sometimes 
include inaccurate patent marking.  The patent may have expired (often, no one has the 
job of reviewing old packaging for whether the patents are still in effect), the seven-digit 
number may be wrong, or the patent may not actually apply to the product, perhaps 
because of miscommunication between the seller’s legal and marketing people.  
¶18 The Federal Circuit had scared sellers in 2009 by interpreting the false marking 
provision in the patent statute to reckon statutory damages per item sold, as opposed to 
per violation.22  Like the report of a gold strike, the case sparked a cottage industry of 
false marking suits.  A major target was the Solo Plastic Cup company.  Solo makes and 
sells billions of plastic cups.  In that low-margin business, Solo decided not to spend the 
money to change its manufacturing molds when its patents expired.  As it knowingly sold 
falsely marked cups, it risked having to pay out a gigantic award.  A few cents per cup 
adds up, if multiplied by millions.  The Federal Circuit, however, held that the false 
marking statute applies liability only when the defendant acts with intent to deceive the 
public.  Solo acted to save manufacturing costs, not to deceive the public, and so escaped 
liability.  Manufacturers breathed a sigh of relief. 
 
22 See Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1303–04 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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7. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
178 L. Ed. 2d 286 (2010) 
¶19 SEB addressed a question that the Supreme Court will review next year—what state 
of mind is necessary for secondary liability.  Specifically, when may a party be liable for 
the infringement of others?  Federal Circuit case law had suggested that a party could be 
liable for inducing infringement only where “he or she knew of the patent.”23  In SEB, the 
defendant did not specifically know of the patent in question.  Rather, it copied the 
features of a deep fryer.  Knowing that there were numerous patents on products in that 
market, the defendant deliberately avoided analyzing whether that particular product was 
patented.  The Federal Circuit held that such “deliberate indifference of a known risk” 
was sufficient.  The SEB case will provide the Supreme Court an opportunity to expand 
on the standards for secondary infringement that it explored in copyright in its earlier 
opinion in Grokster.24 
¶20 SEB also addressed a key issue on the intersection between commercial law and 
patent law.  Patent law is territorial.  If a product is patented in the US, its sale abroad 
does not infringe the US patent.  If a seller ships goods from China, does that infringe? 
The seller in SEB argued that there was no infringement by shipping goods from China, 
because the goods were shipped “FOB China”—meaning that the seller’s obligations 
under the sales law were fulfilled once the goods were shipped.  But the court looked past 
the formalities of the Uniform Commercial Code to the practical reality, which was that 
the seller had shipped goods to a buyer in the US. 
8. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)25 
¶21 Ariad addressed the question, how does an inventor show that she has sufficient 
possession of the invention to be entitled to a patent?  The concept of possession lies deep 
in property law.  Possession governed claims of ownership of a wild fox in Pierson v. 
Post, the first case in many property courses.  To get a patent, an inventor must submit an 
application describing the invention and enabling others to use it.  The Federal Circuit 
has held this to be two requirements: enablement, which requires the inventor to disclose 
to others how to make and use the invention, and written description, which requires the 
inventor to show that she had “possession” of the invention when she filed her 
application.  Some have argued that this reads two requirements where the statute has 
one, and smuggles in a property law concept that the statute does not require.  The 
Federal Circuit, sitting en banc in Ariad, affirmed that the written description requirement 
is separate from the enablement requirement.  This has considerable practical impact in 
areas like biotech and chemistry, where an inventor may be able to make a useful 
invention before she has determined just how to describe what it is.  Under Ariad, she 
must wait to file until she can provide conceptual proof of “possession.”  Delay can cost 
money, and even cost patent rights, such as if publications or other products in the area 
make the invention nonpatentable.  
 
23 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
24 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005). 
25 This was a partial en banc opinion.  The court only reviewed en banc Part III.B., which dealt 
specifically with the requisite intent for infringement.  
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9. Sky Technologies LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
¶22 Patent law is federal law.  Commercial law is generally state law, governed by 
various states’ adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Where the two bodies of law 
overlap, there can be uncertainty as to which governs.  Sky Technologies addressed a key 
issue in the intersection between intellectual property and commercial law.  Possession 
had played a comical role in In re Coldwave Systems.26  A lender had not filed to perfect 
its security interest in a patent given as collateral for a loan.  The creditor creatively, if 
vainly, argued that it need not file, because it had possession of the patent certificate, just 
as a pawnshop perfects by possession of the jewelry in its safe.27  Coldwave reflects a 
great uncertainty in the intersection between commercial law and intellectual property.  
Courts have struggled to rule whether a creditor should file in the federal office (the 
USPTO or the Copyright Office) or in the relevant state Uniform Commercial Code filing 
system.28 
¶23 Sky Technologies addressed a related uncertainty: whether federal law or state law 
governs the procedure for sale of the collateral, if the lender forecloses and sells the 
patent.  The Federal Circuit held that state law governs.  That meant that state foreclosure 
law could apply, and the patent sold subject to the same procedures and protections that 
govern other types of collateral.  Intellectual property is the subject of many finance 
transactions, from loans to joint ventures to securitization and beyond.  The simple and 
clear approach taken by Sky Technologies (treating intellectual property like any 
collateral) will facilitate those transactions.  
10. Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
¶24 Crocs provides considerable guidance on the question of how much inventive spark 
is required to get a patent in this high-tech age.  Nonobviousness is the central 
requirement for patent protection.  An applicant is not entitled to a patent if the claimed 
invention would have been obvious to one working in the relevant field, in light of all 
work in the field.  In KSR, the Supreme Court set a new, more flexible standard.29  
Previously, courts had held that an invention would be nonobvious unless there was a 
specific item with “teaching, suggestion or motivation” for making the invention.  KSR 
rejected that rigid test, giving the USPTO and courts more latitude in deciding if an 
invention was obvious.  KSR allowed courts to look not just to specific work in the field, 
but also to market conditions, the path of technological development, and even common 
sense, in assessing if an innovation was predictable.  
¶25 There were a good number of obviousness cases in 2010, as courts adjust to the 
change in approach.  Crocs is included simply as an example of the practical approach 
courts are taking.  Even a very low-tech invention may still be held nonobvious, and so 
patentable.  The use of foam straps was held to be a patentable invention, largely because 
previous work in the field “taught away” from foam straps.  Straps had been used on 
 
26 In re Coldwave Sys., LLC, 368 B.R. 91, 98 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007). 
27 Id. 
28 See In re Cybernetic Serv., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding security interest in 
patents perfected by state law filing); In re Peregrine Entm’t, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 199–200 (C.D. Cal.,1990) 
(holding federal filing required for copyrights). 
29 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). 
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shoes, and foam had been used in shoes, but the inelastic nature of foam made it seem 
unsuitable as a strap material.  So although KSR has given courts and the USPTO more 
flexibility to deny patents, simple but genuine innovations may still qualify for 
protection. 
II. PATENT PENDING 
¶26 Three patent cases are currently pending before the Supreme Court.  Board of 
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems Inc., 
involves whether university inventors may assign rights to federally funded inventions.30  
SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., analyzes whether “deliberate indifference” to 
existence of patent sufficient for secondary liability.31  i4i LP v. Microsoft Corp., 
discusses whether presumption of patent validity applies where the patent office did not 
consider the relevant prior art.32 
¶27 The Federal Circuit has en banc decisions pending in two cases with broad 
applicability. 
¶28 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. reviews when inequitable conduct in 
obtaining a patent may make the patent unenforceable.33  TiVo v. EchoStar analyzes 
when civil contempt proceedings or infringement proceedings should apply, where a 
modified product is used after an injunction against infringement.34 
III. TRADEMARK 
1. American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 
2212, 176 L. Ed. 2d 947 (2010) 
¶29 American Needle addressed the issue, to what extent competitors may band 
together in using trademarks to exclude other potential competitors.  As Princo shows in 
the patent context, intellectual property policy often requires weighing exclusive rights 
against market forces.35  Princo involved the limits on agreements a patent holder could 
make with others that might restrict competition.  American Needle analyzed the question 
of when a rights holder is, for antitrust purposes, negotiating with others or with itself.  
The question was whether the teams of the National Football League were a single entity, 
or competitors, potentially liable under antitrust laws for concerted action in trademark 
licensing.  The Court held that even if the teams have to cooperate to produce football 
games, “the teams compete with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract 
fans, for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel.”36  For 
competitors to band together the control the market for licensing their trademarks 
therefore was a potential antitrust violation.  The ruling has considerable impact beyond 
sports licensing.  In many industries, competitors have to cooperate, such as forming 
 
30 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 178 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2010). 
31 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 178 L. Ed. 2d 286 (2010). 
32 598 F.3d 831 ( Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, no. 10-290 (2010). 
33 374 Fed. Appx. 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
34 376 Fed. Appx. 21 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
35 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
36 American Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2212.  
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committees to set industry technology standards.  American Needle may play a role in 
separating permissible cooperation from exclusionary practices. 
2. Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2010)  
¶30 Sensient continues the efforts of courts to define which categories of uses of a 
trademark may potentially infringe.  Trademarks are part of the basic vocabulary of a 
commercial society.  There is no trademark infringement without use, in commerce, of 
the mark or a similar symbol.  But courts have differed on what constitutes “use” of a 
mark.  Use of the mark only infringes if there is a likelihood of confusion.  But the 
likelihood of confusion is a multi-factor determination, which makes it hard to predict 
whether particular uses infringe.  So the initial question may be, what constitutes a use of 
the mark, for the purposes of trademark law.  Is a mark “used” every time it is mentioned, 
quoted, referred to, listed, or otherwise employed?  Or does “use” have a narrower 
meaning in trademark law, referring to only use of the mark as a trademark? 
¶31 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., had held that sale of trademarks in keyword 
advertising was use of the mark, for the purposes of trademark law.37  The appellate court 
remanded the case, for determination of whether the use was likely to cause confusion, 
and therefore infringed.  By contrast, Sensient Technologies held that use of a 
competitor’s mark in news releases and (non-sales) presentations was not a use in 
commerce.  So the question of whether there was likelihood of confusion was not 
reached.  The boundaries of trademark protection remain unsettled.  The question 
remains, how courts will draw the boundaries: by defining categories that fall inside or 
outside “use” of the mark, or by relying on the old standby, whether there is a likelihood 
of confusion.  
3. Tiffany v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010)  
¶32 Secondary liability is of primary importance in applying intellectual property to 
internet issues.  Infringers may be numerous and hard to track down.  But thousands of 
infringers may use a single online service provider, such as YouTube or eBay.  So online 
service providers make a juicy target for rights holders.  The Second Circuit, however, 
held that eBay was not liable for users’ sales of knockoff Tiffany products.  It held that 
for “contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider must have 
more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell 
counterfeit goods.  Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are 
infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.”38  This echoes the approach taken in 
copyright, in Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.39  Tiffany marks a convergence 
in the standards governing internet service providers, whether their customers upload 
videos or auction knock-offs.   
 
37 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
38 Tiffany v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
39 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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4. Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) 
¶33 Gucci provides a nice contrast to Tiffany.  Credit card processors, as financial 
institutions, are also attractive defendants.  To get paid, infringers need to use a payment 
system.  The issue was of liability for processing credit card transactions for online 
merchants that sold knockoffs of Gucci products.  Simply processing credit card 
transactions would not give rise to liability.  But a credit card processor would be liable if 
it knowingly served high risk clients and helped them to infringe.  For example, a credit 
card processor could be liable by suggesting that purchasers must check a box 
recognizing that they were buying replicas, in order to reduce the number of returns. 
5. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010) and DSPT 
Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) 
¶34 Toyota Motor Sales and DSPT International provide guidance on the issue, when 
use of a domain name is in bad faith.  The Internet has opened up many vistas for uses of 
trademarks, whether by mark owners to market their wares, or for others to communicate 
(in ways good and bad) with others interested in the relevant product or services.  The 
Anti-Cybersquatting Act specifically regulates one category of use, by prohibiting bad 
faith use of another’s mark in a domain name.  The statute takes its name from an early 
practice of simply registering a mark as a domain name (say, Microsoft.com) before the 
mark owner became web savvy enough to register the domain name, then “squatting” on 
the domain until the mark owner ransomed it.  Practices have become more complex, 
requiring courts to sift out bad faith from bona fide uses.  Toyota Motor Sales held that an 
automobile broker’s use of “Lexus” in its domain name was not bad faith.  The relevant 
domains were buy-a-lexus.com and buyorleaselexus.com.  The broker was not a Toyota 
dealer, but dealt in Toyotas along with other automobiles.  Although the broker used 
Toyota’s mark, it used it in a legitimate manner to describe its goods. 
¶35 Good faith use of a domain name can become bad faith.  In DSPT, an employee of 
a clothing merchant registered a domain name, www.eq-Italy.com, for the company.  The 
company used the site with increasing success over the years.  The employee and the 
company then parted ways.  Not long after, any visitor to www.eq-Italy.com saw only a 
notice referring “all fashion related questions” to the employee’s email address.  The 
employee demanded a considerable sum to hand over the domain.  The Ninth Circuit held 
that the employee used the domain in bad faith.  He had registered it in good faith and 
had never used it to deceive potential customers.  But bad faith goes beyond such classic 
cybersquatting, to encompass other abusive practices.  Toyota and DSPT together provide 
considerable guidance on how courts will unpack the broad standard of “bad faith.” 
6. Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 
2010) 
¶36 Under first sale (also known as exhaustion), the buyer of an authorized product 
may use it.  But first sale has definite limits.  In Au-Tomotive Gold, defendants bought 
genuine Volkswagen badges, and put them on cars not produced by Volkswagen.  First 
sale does not authorize such a use and there was the requisite likelihood of confusion for 
 322
Vol. 9:4] Stephen McJohn 
infringement.  Consumers could be confused, thinking that the cars were produced by or 
endorsed by Volkswagen.  Au-Tomotive Gold shows that ownership of an object does not 
mean that the object is free of the ownership of others. 
7. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prod. LP v. Myers Supply Inc., 621 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 
2010) 
¶37 Georgia-Pacific provided another angle on whether trademarked products may be 
mixed with other goods.  Georgia Pacific sold a touch-less paper-towel dispenser, 
trademarked “enMotion.”  Georgia Pacific also sold paper towels to fit the dispenser.  
The defendant sold replacement paper towels that fit the dispenser.  Unlike in Au-
Tomotive Gold, there was no showing of likelihood of confusion.  Evidence of industry 
practices showed that it was common practice to use substitute paper towels.  There was 
no showing that bathroom consumers were likely to be confused about the source of the 
towels. 
¶38 Georgia-Pacific is different from Au-Tomotive Gold in a more fundamental way.  
Finding infringement in Au-Tomotive Gold prevented the use of a mark on goods from a 
different source.  Volkswagen’s mark could not be used on other cars.  But finding 
infringement in Georgia-Pacific would have prevented the use of a mark on a separate 
market for goods.  By selling paper towel dispensers, Georgia Pacific would have the 
exclusive market for towels for the dispenser.  Georgia-Pacific shows that the trademark 
owner has limited control over authorized products that have left her hands.  As long as 
they are not used in a manner that is likely to confuse the relevant consumer, the 
trademark owner does not have the right to prevent uses that may hurt in the marketplace. 
8. VISA Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) 
¶39 The use of the mark eVisa for an English language tutoring service would not 
infringe the famous mark Visa for credit card services.  The marks are pretty similar, but 
the services are so different that there would not be the requisite likelihood of confusion.  
But famous marks have protection against not just infringement, but dilution.  Dilution 
became almost impossible to show (in a case where there was not infringement as well), 
under the Supreme Court’s 2003 Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc. decision, which 
interpreted the statute to require a showing that the defendant’s use actually decreased the 
distinctive power of the famous mark.40  Congress subsequently amended the statute to 
require only a likelihood of dilution, and dilution has become resurgent.  Charbucks 
diluted Starbucks (despite far different graphics);41 The Other Red Meat, for salmon, 
diluted The Other White Meat, used by the Pork Board;42 and SEE IT SAY IT used by a 
mom and pop therapeutic products company diluted Mattel’s popular SEE’N’SAY 
game.43  Commentators have questioned the broadening of dilution.  Marks like 
Charbucks and The Other Red Meat might actually reinforce the distinctiveness of their 
famous targets, by reinforcing the mark.  But courts have interpreted dilution broadly.  
 
40 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 155 L. Ed.2d 1 (2003). 
41 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009). 
42 National Pork Board & National Pork Producers Council v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Company, 
96 U.S.P.Q. 2D (BNA) 1479 (TTAB 2010). 
43 Super Duper, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 382 Fed. Appx. 308 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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Given that the typical dilution defendant is generally a small business facing up to a 
famous adversary (by the definition of the cause of action), this trend of cases may cause 
considerable caution in treading anywhere near the commercial footprints of giants. 
9. Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2010) 
¶40 Jay Franco emphasizes the boundaries between trademark and patent.  The round 
design of a beach towel cannot be trademarked.  The circular shape is functional, because 
a round towel will work differently than a towel of a different shape.  A seller that wishes 
to have exclusive rights in functional elements must invent and patent them—and the 
round beach towel would hardly be a novel invention.  Trademark cannot be used to get 
such quasi-patent protection.  As the court put it, one cannot get “a trademark on the 
circle.”44 
10. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, No. 08-16382, 2010 WL 4749044 (9th 
Cir. Nov. 24, 2010) 
¶41 FreecycleSunnyvale is a rare case holding that a mark holder failed to sufficiently 
control use of the mark, and therefore lost trademark protection.  Trademark protection, 
unlike copyright and patent, requires the holder to control the use of the mark.  A 
trademark serves to distinguish one source of goods or services from other sources.  If the 
mark holder allows others freely to use the mark, then the mark does not serve to identify 
a source, and so is not a valid mark.  Courts, however, generally apply a relatively lax 
standard.  As long as a mark holder retains some ability to control use of the mark, the 
mark remains valid, even if license widely to others. 
¶42 In FreecycleSunnyvale, the mark holder did not even exercise that level of control.  
The court held that the licensor engaged in “naked licensing,” thereby abandoning the 
mark.  The court held that the licensor did not retain express contractual control or actual 
control over its licensees’ quality control measures and was unreasonable in relying on 
the licensee’s quality control measures.  By licensing the mark without retaining control 
over its use, the mark owner surrendered its right to exclude others from using the mark.  
FreecycleSunnyvale reminds mark owners not to take on the benefits of licensing the 
mark without retaining some control over their licensee’s use of the mark. 
 
44 Jay Franco, 615 F.3d at 860.  See also Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 616 F.3d 
722 (7th Cir. 2010) (decided the same day, holding that the design for an x-frame folding chair is functional 
and so not protectable as a mark).  See also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., No. 1:09cv736, 2010 WL 
3063152 (E.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2010) (holding that Google was not liable for using trademarks in key word 
advertising, because the marks serve “an essential indexing function”). 
